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The European Union: 





The collection and use of personal data is being increasingly scrutinized by 
governments and the European Union (EU) has been attempting to handle the 
development of data protection based progressive protections to protect its citizens 
data and right to privacy. With the reemergence of Russia in challenging the state 
of affairs within Europe, their illegal seizure of the Crimea from Ukraine 
demonstrated the lengths Russia will go to in order to preserve its sphere of 
influence. Furthermore, Russia’s use of cyber tactics and hybrid warfare has 
caused many in Europe to become more concerned for their security. When viewed 
through the lens of Power Transition Theory, the actions of the EU have indicated 
that it has been working to ensure it is protected from a dissatisfied actor's potential 
rise. Indeed, with Russia's investment into using cyber-attacks, the EU has acted to 
protect itself, its members, and its citizens. 
 
 
Matthew D. Wurst 





The European Union (EU) is a configuration of 27 member states on the European 
continent that have primarily integrated their traditionally sovereign economies to 
compete within the global economy. The EU’s jurisdiction has expanded beyond 
traditional economic policy to encompass several other policy domains that 
tangentially relate to economic regulation. Following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the states of Europe were able to focus on restructuring themselves into the 
modern EU to match the new security dynamics in Europe. Indeed, the EU was 
finally able to achieve its long-term goal of creating a single European market, 
which significantly shifted power dynamics in centralizing its influence and 
expanding membership within Europe.  
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When framed through the lens of Power Transition Theory, the actions of 
the EU demonstrate its need to ensure security for itself, its member states, and its 
citizens. As the world has become increasingly globalized, a reliance on data has 
played a large role in the growing prevalence of the Internet and technology in the 
international economy. Because of the sheer amount of data available, bad actors 
and dissatisfied states can collect large amounts of data with the intent to possibly 
influence the internal dynamics of other states. Thus, the EU has proactively 
enacted a progressive data protection regime, starting in the 1990s, and has 
remained vigilant in ensuring its citizens’ progressive privacy and data protection 
rights at the international level. 
  
As Russia has aggressively reasserted its regional power within Europe, 
concerns over new areas of conflict have emerged. Indeed, since the end of World 
War II, the European continent has enjoyed relative stability and has been free from 
violent conflict. However, with the development of technology and the Internet, 
states are now able to infringe on another’s sovereignty with relative ease. This 
emergence of hybrid warfare and the deployment of cyber-attacks has raised new 
concerns of how to maintain the security of the EU and its members from these 
kinds of attacks.  
 
Though data privacy has not yet been recognized as an internationally 
protected human right enforceable by international law globally, the EU has created 
its own regime of international law as the foundation for its progressive laws within 
Europe. Due to this, the EU has been able to enact privacy and data protection laws 
through the lens of economic regulation, but also to ensure the security of the EU 
and its members from the increased introduction and reliance of technology in 
conflict between states.   
 
 
POWER TRANSITION THEORY  
 
Introduced in 1958, Power Transition Theory (PTT) was developed to account for 
the incidence of wars fought for control of the international system among the very 
strongest of states (Lemke 2002, 21).1 PTT does establish a hierarchical system of 
international relations as an independent theory of international relations and power 
dynamics. Specifically, PTT focuses on the “maintenance of and changes to the 
 
1 Power Transition Theory was first introduced by A.F.K Orgnaski in World Politics (1958) to 
describe a hierarchical international structure that explains the actions between states, specifically 
in contrast to Balance of Power theory within realism, in particular a dominant and a challenging 
state.  
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international system,” where the satisfaction of each state plays a significant role in 
its actions and outlook on the international system (Lemke 1997, 24).  
 
However, the prevalence of realism and liberalism in explaining the 
international community has led to PTT exhibiting aspects of both theories (Lemke 
1997, 24). In his influential book Regions of War and Peace, Lemke expands 
Orgnaski’s theory beyond its original application to the great or major powers 
applying the theory to regional hierarchies of states (2002). In the realist vein, PTT 
describes how the internal growth of a state impacts its relative power which is 
constantly changing. The “combination of power parity between challenger and 
dominant state combined with the challenger’s negative evaluation of the status quo 
provides the necessary condition for war,” specifically great power war, and 
therefore control of the international system (Lemke 1997, 24). In the liberal vein, 
PTT allows for the dominant state to establish its own hierarchy within the 
international community. The most prominent example is after World War II when 
the United States broke with traditional balance of power realism governing 
international relations to establish a liberal international order. Lemke extends this 
theory to include regions within the international community, allowing for the 
examination of regional international relations and the emergence of regional 
hegemons (1997, 25). Although a regional hegemon has accumulated more power 
than its regional neighbors, it remains significantly less powerful than the global 
hegemon.  
 
As with any theory, there are a few issues with PTT and how it is applied in 
the real world. Chief among these issues is the ability of the theory to choose which 
states that are rising in its power are challengers and which are not, as well as 
identifying revisionist goals in a possible challenger to the hegemonic control of 
the international system (Lemke 1997). For example, there has been a significant 
amount of academic research and public resources dedicated to understanding the 
relationship between Russia and the United States, yet significantly less research 
has been conducted on the German-American relationship. Both Russia and 
Germany have seen significant economic and regional growth since the end of the 
Cold War and are considered important players at the international level. Research 
on the relationship between member states and the policies that are accepted by the 
EU shows there is a general consensus that Germany is the unofficial ‘leader’ 
following the Great Recession in 2008 (Fix 2018).2 Germany, however, is an 
important ally of the United States and is therefore not considered a threat to 
 
2 While Fix ultimately focuses on the role that Germany plays in the EU’s response to the crisis in 
Ukraine following the Russian invasion and occupation, the role of Germany within the EU is 
displayed and is significant enough to span more than just the response to the Ukrainian Crisis.  
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American hegemony. Russia, on the other hand, is an active instigator of conflict 
that has been involved in re-establishing its role as a regional power in Europe by 
engaging in conflict with Georgia and Ukraine. Furthermore, it is an indisputable 
fact by the American intelligence community of Russian involvement in the 2016 
General Election, further demonstrating Russia’s active role in undermining the 
status quo (S. Rpt. 116-290). 
 
 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION 
 
To this day, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) by the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) remains the defining document on human 
rights that is widely accepted by the majority of states in the international 
community. Unlike many of the other rights established in the UDHR, the right to 
privacy is still not completely defined within the domestic sphere of many states. 
Despite this inconvenience, the right to privacy is an established right under 
international human rights law, and of particular importance is connecting data 
protection to the right to privacy.  
 
Article 12 of the UDHR outlines the international human right to privacy,3 
however there is another significant piece of international law that covers the right 
to privacy: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In 
Article 17, the right to privacy is laid out in two sections. The first establishes the 
right to privacy and the second provides an enforcement mechanism for states to 
enact legal protections for the right to privacy.4 Upon examining the travaux 
préparatoires, the official record of negotiation between signatories of a treaty, 
behind both the UDHR and ICCPR, the right to privacy was included in discussions 
as the treaties developed, not necessarily as an original right in the first draft 
(Diggleman and Cleis 2014, 457). Further scrutiny reveals that the right to privacy 
is meant to guarantee against infringement to individuals by the state or persons, 
whether they be natural or legal (United Nations 1994). Krishnamurthy (2020) 
emphasizes that the right to privacy includes ensuring that “information concerning 
a person’s private life does not reach the hands of persons who are not authorized 
by law to receive, process and use it” (27). The implications are impactful by 
 
3 Article 12 reads: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to 
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 
4 Article 17 specifically reads:  
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
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serving as a basis for the EU to pursue the protection of privacy and data protection. 
The EU has continued its push for data protection as a human right as technology 
becomes more integrated into everyday life. This is foundational to the EU and is 
enshrined within the European Convention of Human Rights’ (ECHR) language 
concerning the right to privacy in Article 8.5  
 
Data is important in determining and protecting the right to privacy and can 
be generated about people without their knowledge or consent, whereby the most 
meaningless or complex information can be saved and processed electronically 
(Boehme-Nebler 2016). The abundance of data available for states to record and 
process has dawned the concept of data protection. Governments have derived their 
concern for their citizens and their own data after seeing the costs of big data 
collection. It is inconceivable to comprehend the sheer amount of “data being 
collected, in so many ways, that it is practically impossible to give people a 
meaningful way to keep track of all the information about them that exists out there, 
much less to consent to its collection in the first place” (Mundie 2014). The 
remaining problem is that even when citizens consent to a user agreement, they 
may not understand how, when, or where their data is used by an entity.  
 
Therefore, the objective of data protection is to secure the individual’s 
human dignity and personal development because, without some form of inviolable 
privacy, an individual’s personality cannot develop successfully (Boehme-Nebler 
2016, 223). It is this link to the individual’s inherent need for privacy that connects 
data protection with human rights and, by extension, international law. In particular, 
the EU’s continued economic integration has meant that data and data protection 
have become cemented in the EU’s jurisdiction and at least regionally within 
Europe, international law. Data protection within the EU refers to efforts aimed at 
protecting Europeans’ fundamental right to privacy from infringement or 




5 The ECHR was adopted on 4 November 1950 and came into force in 1953. Article 8 specifically 
states:  
Right to respect for private and family life 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as 
is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.  
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POWER TRANSITION THEORY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION’S PUSH FOR 
DATA PROTECTION 
 
There is a reason beyond simple regulation for the EU’s aggressive stance on data 
protection: data protection is essential for the security of the EU and its members. 
By including data protection within its jurisdiction, the EU’s regulations serve a 
dual purpose of economic regulation and security. Following PTT, this is due to the 
EU’s wariness of the emergence of and rejection by Russia to current regional 
power dynamics.  
 
The EU represents the member states’ need to remain economically relevant 
internationally. Important in understanding regional power dynamics, economic 
competition is directly relevant to the amount of power and influence the EU 
accumulates within the region. The European Commission has stated previously 
that the EU’s goal is “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world,” indicating economic ambitions for international 
competition (Kugler, Fisunoglu, and Yesilada 2015). Indeed, the EU is now often 
considered a singular actor pursuing its interests within international relations, to 
which PTT provides interesting insight behind European relations.  
 
PTT approaches international relations recognizing both horizontal and vertical 
forms of integration within the international and regional communities. Thus, the 
EU remains an important entity for both Europe and the international system. PTT 
demonstrates that within a hierarchical structure, the most powerful nations or 
entities attempt to manage the regional dynamics, meaning that disagreeing nations 
who are dissatisfied will emerge to challenge the prevailing structures (Kugler et. 
al. 2015, 49). This is the precise relationship occurring with the EU and Russia 
within Europe, exacerbated by the emergence of hybrid warfare and cyber tactics 
that rely on access to data. Member states, by banding together through integration, 
ensure that the EU is a singular entity that represents the security of the majority of 
European nations, particularly for international economic competition.  
 
Concerning data protection, the EU has recognized that “promoting high 
standards of data protection and facilitating international trade” and security are 
essential (European Commission 2017). Data represents both a tremendous trade 
commodity and social asset, where a natural tension between economic welfare and 
the protection of fundamental rights presents a conflict for the EU in its role as a 
regulator (Yakovleva 2018, 478). By constituting data protection as an economic 
regulation, the EU can properly regulate the use and collection of data, and 
simultaneously protect the fundamental rights of its citizens and the security of its 
members. Difficulty remains in grounding data protection in international law 
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because “[n]either public international law nor international trade law provide for 
adequate mechanisms to balance trade liberalization objectives against non-
economic human rights concerns” (Yakovleva 2018, 479). This means that the 
EU’s approach to fundamental rights, such as privacy and data protection, is 
anchored in the ECHR and broader international human rights law. The regulations 
on data serve a dual purpose of economic regulation and security of member states 
through promotion of aggressive data protection law.  
 
Given the complexity in establishing stringent standards for the economic 
regulation and protection of its member states, the progression of treaties that 
established the EU have increasingly given it the authority to protect the economic 
interests of its members and citizens of Europe in general. While not given the 
direct authority to engage in more traditional activities of foreign affairs that are 
reserved to states, the EU has established and understands its role in the current 
international problems through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
(EEAS 2016).  
 
 As PTT attempts to predict the power relations within Europe as a region, 
it remains important to understand the institutional restrictions placed on the EU by 
the member states. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
handles its European members’ security policy and involvement, while the EU 
serves as the member states' coalition pooling their economic resources, with both 
organizations strengthening their members' individual power on the international 
stage. Indeed, because of this dual representation of member states, EU-NATO 
relations form a complex web of conflicting and coinciding jurisdictions and 
outcomes (Græger 2016). However, the EU’s commitment of exclusive 
membership to solely European members demonstrates the largest consolidation of 
European resources and interests, while the influence of the United States and other 
members in NATO marks it more as a Western alliance rather than a solely 
European alliance. By extension, it is logical to apply PTT to the EU as it represents 
the most centralized significant voice of European interests. This implies that the 
EU has replaced a typical state as regional hegemon, and Russia is acting in 
accordance to its status as a rising and dissenting power to the EU’s centrality to 
regional power dynamics.    
 
 
DATA PRIVACY DIRECTIVE (1995) AND THE GENERAL DATA 
PROTECTION REGULATION (2016)  
 
While PTT’s importance is in attempting to predict regional power conflicts, which 
mostly results in violence between the hegemon and challenger, the EU has 
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achieved staving off Russia’s increased influence within Europe by passing 
aggressive regulations concerning data protection. Indeed, while dynamics 
following the Cold War did not immediately indicate future friction between the 
EU and Russia, the EU has worked to peacefully secure its resources and interests 
from outside interference. In accordance with this goal, two significant pieces of 
legislation have been passed by the EU that attempt to create and enforce data 
protection standards by regulating its economic activity.  
 
Starting in 1995, the EU passed what is known as the Data Privacy Directive 
(DPD). Enacted after years of discussion among the member states, its purpose was 
to accomplish the harmonization between members, to allow the free flow of 
information within the EU, and to provide a “high level of protection” concerning 
individual data privacy rights (Newman 2008, 74). With the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, the EU became the central economic power player in Europe. Russia 
remained a power player in European affairs after its democratic transition and was 
generally welcomed by retaining its permanent status on the Security Council at the 
UN, acceptance into the G8 in 1997, and mostly retained credibility on the 
international stage.  
 
The EU has continued to act in a fashion that guarantees the right to privacy 
and data protection. Guaranteed in the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), the EU holds the 
position that “the privacy of communications and the protections of personal data 
to be fundamental human rights” (Weiss and Archick 2016, 2). Protections cover 
the possession of all personal data gathered automatically or manually, allow 
individuals significant access to their data, and grant the ability for individuals to 
seek damages if necessary (Weiss and Archick, 2-3). Of particular interest is the 
DPD’s requirement that mandates transfers of personal data out of the member state 
or EU only if the European Commission certifies that the country provides 
adequate levels of protections to that of the DPD.  
 
The need for the European Commission to certify that another state has 
adequate protections means that states interested in trading directly with the EU 
also need similar protections in place. The EU’s progressive measures towards data 
protection are rooted in both international economic law and international human 
rights law, which forces states that choose to trade with the EU to adhere to its 
rigorous standards. It is important not to underestimate the influence that security 
plays in these standards both for member states and its citizens. With the European 
Commission regulating who meets adequate protections, the EU is able to passively 
ensure the security of its member states by protecting the vast amount of data 
moving through economic activity against cyberattacks.  
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As Russia’s significance has grown, the EU itself has significantly increased its 
stature in international relations as its own entity that represents its own interests 
separate from the member states. By the mid-2010s it was abundantly clear that 
new standards were needed to further advance the EU’s jurisdiction and protection 
of its citizens privacy from interference to meet the advancing capabilities in 
technology. To this end, the EU was in the process of passing a new data protection 
law called the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which was passed in 
April 2016 and became applicable to the member states in May 2018 when it 
officially repealed and replaced the DPD (Voss 2016).  
 
The GDPR is aimed at establishing strict standards as a protection for its 
citizens and member states from increased Russian aggression in the region. 
Specifically, the GDPR states that adequacy decisions by the European 
Commission must certify that a third country has similar access to justice, rule of 
law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and a domestic 
infrastructure capable of ensuring the protection of personal data and privacy (IT 
GOVERNANCE 2019, 257-58). These conditions for certification of adequacy 
enforce the two main requirements under the GDPR’s necessities for transferring 
data outside of the EU: the destination has been subject to an adequacy decision 
and that the transfer is subject to appropriate safeguards (IT GOVERNANCE 2019, 
256).  
 
The key protections offered by the GDPR are such that the private entities, 
as well as state actors, must comply with the high level of protection the EU has 
declared appropriate. Article 46 clearly states that there must be some form of 
legally binding and enforceable instrument between public and private authorities, 
binding corporate rules with standard data protection clauses, and complying with 
other protections aimed at protecting access to personal data and how data can be 
used. The European Commission has reflected that two years after implementation 
the “GDPR has successfully met its objectives of strengthening the protection of 
the individual’s right to personal data protection…within the EU” (European 
Commission 2020, 4). The Commission also states that the influence of the GDPR 
is vast, demonstrating Europe’s role as a global leader for the regulation of the 
digital economy, as well as protecting its citizens from data manipulation.  
 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF HYBRID WARFARE, USE OF CYBER-ATTACKS AND 
RUSSIA’S DISSATISFACTION 
 
There has been an increasing trend by states to develop and deploy resources 
utilizing the growth and prevalence of technology which has considerably focused 
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on data. Perhaps the most prominent proponent of these new tactics is Russia under 
the leadership of Vladimir Putin, particularly its 2014 aggression in Ukraine. 
Indeed, the aggressive acts by Russia, or by its proxies, should be considered acts 
challenging the EU’s influence among states that Russia considers to be its 
traditional sphere of influence.  
 
Technological advancements have allowed for states to develop tactics that cost 
less resources, human life, and can do more damage to their adversaries. Because 
of the evolving development and rapid deployment of new technology, the role that 
hybrid war plays has not been adequately defined in international law. Due to the 
lack of an exact definition of what constitutes hybrid warfare, the ability of the 
international community to identify and respond is a major factor in the increase 
and prevalence of hybrid warfare and deployment of cyberattacks. Indeed, 
according to Bachmann, the use of hybrid warfare was only first recognized in 2006 
in the struggle between Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense Forces in the Second 
Lebanon War (2015, 78). 
 
This begs the question of what is hybrid warfare. In 2010, NATO surmised a 
hybrid threat as “those [threats] posed by adversaries, with the ability to 
simultaneously employ conventional and nonconventional means adaptively in 
pursuit of their objectives” (NATO 2010). Furthermore, citing a 2011 NATO 
report, Aaronson et. al. stated that “[a]dmittedly, [a] hybrid threat is an umbrella 
term, encompassing a wide variety of existing adverse circumstances and actions” 
(2011, 115). Importantly, “[h]ybrid war is never announced officially and, so far, 
has never ended in a conventional war so far. It involves a permanent state of war-
like situation with a variable intensity,” and often involves covert and deniable 
activity (Simons, Danyk, and Maliarchuk 2020, 340). Without a concrete 
definition, hybrid warfare has emerged as a common tactic that states now have to 
regularly face or deploy their own form of. Importantly, hybrid warfare includes, 
but is certainly not limited to a variety of nonconventional tactics, yet it is the 
growing possibility of cyber-attacks that exhibit how the “use of new technologies” 
fall “within the scope of hybrid threats” (Bachmann 2015, 82). 
 
This delineation is imperative. The use of cyber tactics refers “to a sustained 
computer-based cyber-attack by a state against the IT infrastructure of a target 
state” (Bachmann 2015, 82). This is not a limited behavior of states, however, as 
non-state actors may serve as both perpetrators and victims of a cyber-attack. To 
be effective, actors engaging in cyber tactics rely heavily on access to data and 
determine how they can use data to achieve their goals. There are multiple ways 
that data can be obtained, with the two most important for this analysis are data 
collected through illicit state actions via cyber-attacks and through everyday 
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economic activity. Indeed, data manipulation can occur through economic means 
whereby a company sells or analyzes data to influence consumer’s choice or 
through states micro-targeting voters through the unlawful possession, analysis, 
and use of data in interfering with the democratic process (European Commission 
2020, 3-4).   
 
To states, cyber-attacks present a unique opportunity. Cyber tactics are 
potentially devastating and extremely difficult to defend against without 
infrastructure dedicated to such a task. Cyber tactics are additionally relatively 
“low-risk and low-cost means of achieving foreign and security policy aims and 
goals” (Simons et. al. 2020, 337). Indeed, “a solid and agreed upon legal framework 
to regulate [cyber tactics] does not yet exist,” and remain cost effective and deniable 
to states (Simons et. al. 2020, 341). Currently, because of the lack of clarity in 
defining hybrid warfare and the use of cyber tactics, these terms have been used 
increasingly without presenting the differences. To be clear, hybrid warfare 
represents the totality of nonconventional tactics being deployed by states, while 
cyberattacks or cyber tactics is a specific method of hybrid warfare.  
 
 From the Russian perspective, expansion of both NATO and the EU into 
Eastern Europe and other areas of former Soviet dominance has occurred rather 
aggressively. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in a 2007 speech concerning 
NATO specifically that, “I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have 
any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security 
in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces 
the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this 
expansion intended?” (Putin 2007). Clearly Russia is dissatisfied with its current 
role within the international community, and specifically within the European 
sphere, and should be considered a dissatisfied state under PTT within the region. 
While the majority of states in Europe have joined both NATO and the EU, both 
organization’s primary struggle is the handling of Russia’s prominent aggression 
in reasserting itself. Accordingly, as Walt indicates, “Russia is still significantly 
weaker [than the Soviet Union]…but no longer a basket case” in international 
relations (2019, 33).  
 
Of particular importance to this reemergence is why, where, and how Russia 
reacted. Both NATO and the EU represent the encroachment of the West into 
Russia’s traditional domain. Moscow clearly believes that NATO represents the 
growth of the Western security apparatus, while the EU’s growth following the 
Cold War represents equal encroachment in economic affairs. Russia feels its 
security is threatened by this expansion and took aggressive steps in 2008 to prevent 
Georgia from moving closer to NATO and the EU. Yet it was Russia’s blatant 
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interference in Ukraine following its annexation of Crimea in 2014 that truly 
demonstrated Russia’s dissatisfaction within Europe. Russia’s dissatisfaction has 
manifested through its use of nontraditional tactics, like cyber-attacks, as 
demonstrated in both Georgia and Ukraine because of their efforts in courting 
Western influence. 
 
While the conflict in Georgia represents much more traditional conflict, by 
2014 Russia was deploying cyber tactics aimed at benefiting its goals of keeping 
Ukraine out of the EU’s influence. Russia engaged in hybrid warfare by using cyber 
tactics, such as hacks targeted at Ukraine’s telecommunications network and 
national security apparatus, to avoid the entanglements and consequences 
associated with traditional warfare and a possible military engagement with the 
United States (Limnell 2015, 527-28). As the world grappled with how to handle 
this resurgence of Russian aggression, the EU witnessed the cyber tactics Russia 
deployed in Ukraine that spelled immediate and long-term security needs for the 
EU. Indeed, cyber-attacks are not necessarily aimed at military targets, but towards 
public infrastructure, as demonstrated in the hack in December 2016 where Russian 
hackers were successfully able to shut down the power grid in North Kyiv for about 
an hour but remained unsuccessful in causing physical harm to the computing 
system (Simons et. al. 2020, 338-39). 
 
Importantly, the tactics undoubtedly deployed by Russia in both Georgia and 
Ukraine often lack a direct link between the Russian government and the entities 
that orchestrate cyber tactics. As Hollis demonstrates, there is a lack of “substantive 
connection between the orchestrators of the cyberattacks and the Russian 
government” (2011). Giles indicates that while “there is no evidence of dedicated 
‘information troops’ in the Russian military who could directly engage in local and 
regional areas,” Russia learned from their successes and failures in Georgia (2016). 
Further building off its success in the Crimea, Russia demonstrated its abilities in a 
wide scale effort to influence the 2016 Presidential Election in the United States 
with a seemingly dedicated military force for this specific purpose, the Internet 
Research Agency (IRA) and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff 
of the Russian Army (GRU) (Mueller 2016). While the use of hybrid warfare and 
deployment of cyber tactics remains new to the arsenal of states, the Russian 
success in infiltrating American democracy “ranks among the greatest intelligence 
failures of modern times” and serves as a warning to the EU of Russia’s capabilities 
(Sanger et. al. 2020). 
 
 
THE POTENTIAL FOR POLITICAL INTERFERENCE FOR THE EU 
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Russia’s aggressive stances towards Georgia and Ukraine justify the EU’s concerns 
within Europe. Russia “eventually fought a short war with Georgia and Ukraine, 
seized Crimea from Ukraine, and used cyberattacks and ‘hybrid warfare’ to stop 
NATO [and the EU] from moving farther east and to undermine the liberal order 
in Europe (emphasis added)” (Walt 2019, 73). This goal suggests that Russia’s 
dissatisfaction is ultimately aimed at challenging the EU for dominance within the 
European sphere of influence. Other than those directly impacted by Russian cyber 
interference, such as Ukraine and the United States, the EU remains vigilant against 
the advancement of Russia’s capabilities and potential for interference to the EU. 
Importantly, the EU itself does not possess the capabilities to defend itself in terms 
of traditional security as European states have concentrated this power in NATO. 
Yet, this does not dispel the need for the EU to defend itself using the powers it has 
been granted within its jurisdiction to secure its members’ interests, to which it has 
sought to regulate the use and dispersal of data from the EU with the DPD and 
GDPR.   
Not only are states making efforts to protect their individual technological 
infrastructures and the data associated with the actions and operations of the state, 
but cyber tactics are increasingly deployed to obtain economic data from citizens 
of other states. Economic data protection is just as important to state sovereignty 
which demonstrates one of the central reasons for having the EU to begin with. The 
measures taken by the EU to protect the economic data of its citizens and member 
states is simultaneously providing security for its members and citizens.  
 
An important example that highlights the need for these protections, and the 
severity of the consequences if action is not taken, is the massive breach into 
Equifax in 2017 that released a vast amount of personal data. Specifically, as a 
result, hackers were able to steal “the financial and personal information of 
approximately 147 million [people],” providing China with “detailed, organized 
information on nearly half the American population” (Rosenbach and Mansted 
2019). This demonstrates the importance of data protection and the central role the 
right to privacy will continue to play as technology continues to develop and the 
use of cyber tactics and hybrid warfare become more prevalent.  
 
Indeed, the steps taken by Russia under the leadership of President Putin have 
been directly aimed at curbing the influence and reach of the EU. While it was the 
invitation to Georgia and Ukraine to develop action plans for NATO membership 
that spurred Russia’s involvement in Georgia in 2008, the subtle leanings of the 
Ukrainian people towards the pull of the EU was a significant factor in the 2014 
seizure and subsequent annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Katerynchuck 2019 and 
Limnell 2015). The EU has also seen new levels of Euroscepticism, which refers to 
the efforts within EU member states that oppose further integrations, most 
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prominently with the departure of the United Kingdom from the EU. After seeing 
how disinformation greatly impacted the results of the 2016 United States 
Presidential Election and in the June 2016 Brexit referendum, the EU is cautious of 
the impact Russia could play in its internal dynamics if it is able to access citizens’ 
data and disseminate disinformation among citizens of the EU. Furthermore, the 
rise of nationalism within the EU represents a push by Eurosceptics to cause further 
disfunction within the EU, which can be exploited by Russia to further diminish the 





Clearly, the EU has acted in an expected way in its efforts for the protection of 
personal data and privacy. Examined through Power Transition Theory, the EU has 
successfully enacted the most progressive data protection regime in the world 
through economic regulation. Additionally, it is the security benefits of ensuring 
that individual’s personal data and privacy are protected that will make efforts at 
using cyber tactics to disrupt the EU’s influence more difficult. There seems to be 
immediate pressure from Russia flexing its capabilities in Ukraine, as well as 
exhibiting its influence worldwide through its interference with the United States 
2016 Presidential Election. With the increase of the use of cyber-attacks and hybrid 
warfare, a rising Russia that is discontent with its international influence, and the 
accumulative reliance on technology in everyday life, the need for protecting data 
is ever apparent to the EU and its members. 
 
The EU has clearly had its own struggles in unity, especially with the British 
decision to exit the EU, but its security remains paramount to its ability to function 
and ensure the economic competitiveness of its members. Although many EU 
members share membership in NATO, the EU has a need to ensure the economic 
security of its members and itself as the tactics being deployed by Russia to threaten 
the EU are nontraditional security concerns involving cyber tactics and data.  
 
As international relations and power dynamics are constantly developing, it 
will remain important to keep a watchful eye on international events and the 
reactions by the international community. Only time will tell the success or failure 
of the EU. With the increasing prevalence in the use of hybrid warfare and cyber-
attacks among states, along with the reliance on technology and data collection, the 
EU’s early and progressive steps to protect its members’ sovereignty and economic 
competition serve as a standard in the continuing development and enforcement of 
human rights law, extending to the right to privacy, and to data protection.  
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